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For many applications, access control and other business 
related information of all user transactions should be kept 
in secure log files for intrusion and misuse detection or 
system audit purposes. Because the log files may be 
stored on or moved to an untrusted machine and may 
attract attackers because of the large amounts of 
potentially sensitive information contained in them, we 
would like to guarantee that in the event an attacker gains 
access to this machine, we can limit his ability to corrupt 
the log files and we are able to detect any compromises 
afterwards. We also may want to ensure that he can gain 
little or no information from the log files. In this paper we 
propose a secure audit web service (SAWS) which can 
provide a secure audit trail service for multiple clients. 
The secure audit trail generated by SAWS can be stored 
on any untrusted machine and it is impossible to be 
modified or destroyed without detection, and its integrity 
can be validated by any client. Optionally, the audit file 
can be encrypted, making it impossible for unauthorised 
parties to read its contents. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
With the widespread use of the Internet, more and more 
resources and services are available on the web. To better 
help resource web sites improve their system security and 
reliability, a history log or audit trail is usually necessary 
to record all the accesses to the system, so that these can 
be later inspected either daily or periodically during 
system audits. An audit trail is especially important and 
necessary for access control services as it forms a 
significant part of the front-line defence for detecting 
system misuse or intrusion attempts. Unfortunately, since 
a large amount of sensitive information e.g. those related 
to access control decisions, may be contained in the audit 
trail, and the audit trail may be stored on or moved to an 
untrusted machine, this may attract attackers to try to read 
or alter the log records, e.g. remove traces of their actions 
from it. We would like to guarantee, in the event that an 
attacker does gain access to this machine, that although 
we are unable to stop him altering or removing the log 
records or the whole audit trail, nevertheless we are able 
to limit his ability to undetectably corrupt the log files and 
are able to detect the compromise afterwards. Optionally 
and in addition, we can ensure that he will gain little or no 
information from the log files by encrypting them prior to 
storage. This secure audit trail capability is crucial for 
many applications in order to prevent audit trails from 
being tampered with undetectably. Whilst there are 
already some secure auditing schemes for applications 
Schneier and Kelsey [1] rely on a central trusted machine, 
whilst Chong et al [3] rely on a Java iButton and their 
system is only for Digital Rights Management. For a 
virtual organization or distributed application which spans 
multiple servers, multiple application components will 
produce log records in different digital formats that 
contribute to the whole system security analysis, in which 
case a centralised secure audit trail system which provides 
general auditing services may be required. In this paper, a 
PKI-based secure audit web service (SAWS) is described 
which records audit information for distributed 
applications in virtual organizations.  
The primary functionality of a secure audit service is 
to provide permanent secure storage for log records, so 
that it can reliably detect when tampering has occurred. 
Schneier and Kelsey have developed a cryptographic 
mechanism for securing the contents of an audit log 
against unauthorised reading, which provides tamper 
detection [1]. The mechanism relies on symmetric 
encryption, with a central trusted server holding the 
decryption keys. Reading and verification of the log 
records is accomplished with the help of the central 
trusted server. But because of this, when the central 
trusted machine is not available, then it’s impossible for 
users to read and verify the audit trails – this could cause 
an inconvenience for users, a central point of failure, a 
central point of attack, and potentially a bottleneck to 
performance.  
In this paper, we modify Schneier’s scheme by using 
public key cryptography to enable independent reading 
and verification of the audit logs, without the need for the 
central trusted machine. We also use the recent 
developments in Trusted Computing Bases (TCBs) [2] to 
store the private and secret keys of the audit service, so 
that the external central trusted server is no longer needed 
for this either. The remainder of this paper is structured as 
follows: In section 2, the requirements for our secure 
audit web service (SAWS) are described. In Section 3, the 
architecture of SAWS is presented. Section 4 describes 
the security mechanisms adopted in SAWS. Section 5 we 
present a discussion and summary of this paper.  
 
2.  Security Requirements for the Secure 
Audit Web Service 
 
User access requests and activities should be collected 
and sent to SAWS, so that administrators can at a later 
point in time know who did what, including who was 
given access to which resources, and who was denied 
access, for example when wanting to track down an 
attacker. Since several applications may share the same 
SAWS, this leads to the following basic security 
requirements:  
- Append mode of access: Only append mode of 
access should be allowed, so that users or applications 
cannot rewind the audit file and delete or modify 
information that has already been stored there 
- Authorised writing: Only authorised parties 
should be able to append log records to the audit trail. 
Though unauthorised applications or attackers may gain 
access to the audit trail and try to append fake log records 
to the audit trail, or modify or remove the audit trail, this 
should be detected by the tamper detection mechanism.  
- Timestamps: Every record in the audit trail 
should be timestamped by SAWS to provide a trusted 
record of when the audit data was received. We note that 
if SAWS is trusted to record the audit data without 
tampering with it, then it should also be trusted to append 
the correct time to the data. Therefore we do not propose 
to use a secure time stamping service.  If this is 
insufficient for some applications, then because the 
format of the recorded data in each log record is 
application-specific and is determined by the client 
applications themselves, they may contain another 
timestamp provided by the client for cross checking 
purposes.  However the use of the latter is application 
dependent. 
- Secure communication: The communications 
between a SAWS client and the SAWS server should 
ensure tamper resistance, data integrity and authorised 
connection.  
- Secure storage on untrusted media: Since an audit 
trail may be stored on untrusted machines, the SAWS 
security mechanism should ensure persistent and resilient 
storage of the audit trail, and ensure detection of 
tampering of the audit trail – modification, deletion, 
insertion, truncation, or replacement. If tampering is 
detected, SAWS should be able to notify the security 
auditor. 
- Support multiple simultaneous clients. SAWS 
should be easily and conveniently accessible via a web 
service interface, and it should be able to serve multiple 
client applications simultaneously. 
- Performance efficiency: The performance of 
SAWS should be as efficient as possible. Since our initial 
target client is the PERMIS authorisation system, and this 
can make 500 access control decisions per second on a PC 
[7], we made 500 records per second the minimum 
performance requirement for SAWS on the same 
platform. 
- Contents transparency: SAWS should be able to 
record any digital content coming from any SAWS client. 
- Confidentiality and authorised reading: Since the 
audit trail may contain sensitive information, then the 
secure audit mechanism should optionally be able to 
ensure that only authorised applications or people have 
the privilege to read the audit trail.   
Based on the above requirements, we propose the 
following architecture and security mechanisms for 
SAWS. 
 
3. Architecture of the Secure Audit Web 
Service  
 
There are three types of application in the SAWS system 
– the SAWS server, the audit trail viewing tool (VT), and 
the SAWS client. The SAWS server is issued and 
configured with two public/private key pairs – an 
encryption/decryption public/private key pair and a digital 
signing/verifying private/public key pair. Optionally, the 
SAWS clients and the VT may all be issued with their 
own encryption/decryption public/private key pairs. The 
encryption/decryption public/private key pairs are used 
for confidential transmission of information between the 
different components, whilst the signing/verifying 
private/public key pair is used by the SAWS server to 
digitally sign the log file so that any application can verify 
the integrity and authenticity of the log file by using the 
SAWS server’s public key certificate. The structure of 
SAWS is shown in Figure 1 (The VT is not shown in this 
figure). 
The core component in the SAWS server is the Java 
Secure Audit Trail Service (J-SATS). J-SATS is 
responsible for receiving log messages from SAWS 
clients, for securing them (as described in Section 4) and 
then writing the secured audit records into one or more 
permanent audit log files on untrusted machines.  
Three different client interfaces are provided for 
SAWS to facilitate different application scenarios: 
- a Java programmable interface, the J-SATS API,  
- a direct SSL-TLS socket communication interface 
for TCP based clients and  
- a SOAP server over SSL interface for web service 
based clients.  
When the client is remote from the SAWS server and 
is accessing it via the Internet, to ensure secure 
communications between SAWS clients and the SAWS 
server over the Internet, we adopt SSL to ensure mutual 
authentication, message integrity and message 
confidentiality. We did initially intend to use WS-Security 
[6], but the performance of this only allowed us to process 
2 records per second which was an order of magnitude 
worse than SOAP over SSL (which was still an order of 
magnitude worse than our performance target). To meet 
our performance target of 500 records per second, we had 
to use the Java API. 
 
 
4. Security Mechanisms of SAWS 
 
4.1 Secure Storage of the Audit Trail  
 
To ensure secure storage of the audit trail on an untrusted 
machine, the following measures are adopted.  
1) When starting a new audit record file, the SAWS 
writer generates a new random secret key RN, which is 
then stored securely by SAWS so that only it can recover 
it after a crash. RN is stored in the TCB and is also 
encrypted with the public encryption key of the SAWS 
server and stored as the first record of the new audit file. 
RN will be used in the calculation of the secure hash 
which is appended to the end of each log record, in order 
to detect modification of a record’s contents before the 
audit file is finally digitally signed and closed i.e. in the 
case when SAWS prematurely crashes.  
2) The SAWS server places the file name and digital 
signature of the previous audit file as the second record in 
the new audit file. This chains the log files together and 
stops an attacker from completely deleting one or more 
audit files without detection. The digital signature stops 
an alternative authentic file being substituted for the 
correct one by renaming it. 
3) Each record is given a sequence number which 
prevents records from being inserted or deleted in the 
middle of the audit trail. To detect truncation of the file 
from the end after a crash, the current sequence number of 
the log record is stored in the TCB. This allows detection 
of a truncation attack. 
4) SAWS adds the authenticated name/ID of each 
client to each record they submit before writing it to the 
audit trail. This is to stop one client masquerading as 
another in the data that it submits. SAWS uses its own ID 
for each system record that it writes.   
5) SAWS keeps a plain accumulated hash of the 
entire audit file as the log file is built up. This is stored in 
the TCB (along with the current sequence number) in 
order to detect a replacement attack after a crash (i.e. an 
attacker uses an old version of the audit trail to replace the 
latest version of the audit trail after his intrusion into the 
storage system). 
6) When the audit file is complete, the plain 
accumulated hash is written to the end of the file and the 
plain accumulated hash is digitally signed with the 
signing private key of the SAWS server. The signature 
and public key certificates of SAWS are also written to 
the file. Now anyone can verify the completeness of the 
file with the verifying public key of the SAWS server.  
7) Optionally the audit file can be stored in several 
different computers in different locations to defend 
against truncation and replacement attacks. This will also 
allow recovery in cases where one or more (but not all) 
copies are tampered with. Of course, the more copies 
there are at different locations, the more chances there are 
of compromise. But since our purpose is to detect 
tampering rather than to prevent it, and to ensure that at 
least one genuine copy is preserved for audit purposes, 
then as long as not all the copies are attacked our system 
is secure.  
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Figure 1.  Architecture of the Secure Audit Web Service 
can generate a random symmetric encryption key which is 
subsequently used to encrypt the audit records. The key is 
encrypted using the SAWS encryption public key and the 
viewing tool public key and both copies are stored in the 
audit file. Optionally the key can also be encrypted with 
the public keys of all the SAWS clients, so that they can 
each independently verify and view the audit log.  
9) After every 1 second in the idle state, the SAWS 
server writes a heartbeat record to the audit file, so if a 
system crash happens at any time we can know the time 
of the crash to the nearest second. 
 
4.2 Log Record Format 
 
The format of a SAWS log record is shown in Figure 2. 
All log records in the log file use the same format. The jth 
log record LRj is defined as: 
 
LRj = Snj ||UIDj || STj || Tj || Lj-1 || Lj ||Encryptj || Mj || Hj  
 
(1) Snj is the sequence number (4 bytes). 
(2) UIDj is the User ID of this record; it indicates the 
identity of the client that provided this log record. Every 
SAWS client is assigned a unique user ID after 
authentication, and this mapping is held in the 
SysClientID record (see later). The UIDj = 0x00 is 
reserved, and indicates that the log record is written by 
the SAWS server itself (1 byte).  
(3) STj is the log record type (1 byte). 
(4) Tj is the timestamp of the jth log record in format 
of a long integer (8 bytes). 
(5) Lj-1 is the length of the last log record LRj-1 (4 
bytes). 
(6) Lj is the length of the current log record LRj (4 
bytes). 
(7) Encryptj is the encryption indicator for the 




AsymmetricEncryptionForClient (0x04),  or 
NoEncryption (0x00) (1 byte).  
(8) Mj is the jth log message received from the 
SAWS client or from the SAWS server itself (indefinite 
bytes).  
(9) Hj is the secure hash value for this record (20 
bytes).  
(10) || represents the concatenation operation. 
 
Generally there are the following types of log 
records in the audit trail: ClientLogData, 
SAWSRandomNumber, SymmetricEncryptionKey, 
SAWSLastFile, SAWSAccHash, SignatureRecord, 
SAWSCert, SysSAWSStartup, SysSAWSShutdown, 
SysHeartbeat, SysUnauthorisedConnectionAttempt, 
SysAuditorNotification, SysClientID. For log records 
coming from SAWS clients, their log record type should 
be ClientLogData. The other log record types are for 
holding SAWS support data for the audit trail.  
 
4.3 Initialisation, Validation and Recovery of the 
Secure Audit Trail 
 
When the SAWS server first starts up it generates two 
asymmetric key pairs – the SAWS encryption/decryption 
key pair and the signing/verifying key pair. Both the 
private keys will be written to and protected by the TCB 
if this is available. In addition, the encryption/decryption 
key pair is exported in PKCS#12 format for backup by the 
administrator. The private signing key is never exported, 
but if a TCB is not available, then it is stored in (and 
recovered from) an encrypted file, using an administrator 
supplied seed password and an internal key generation 
algorithm. If an external certificate authority is available, 
SAWS will attempt to get both public keys certified using 
either CMC-PKCS#10 [4] or CMP [5]; otherwise self-
signed certificates are created. SAWS also generates a 
secret random number and encrypts it using the SAWS 
encryption public key, and saves it to the 
SAWSRandomNumber record, so in the future, on 
recovery, SAWS will be able to retrieve it. The secret 
random number will be used to calculate the secure hash 
that is appended to each log record for authenticity 
checking purposes. If a configuration parameter requires 
it, SAWS will optionally generate a symmetric encryption 
key and encrypt it with the audit trail viewing tool (VT) 
encryption public key and the SAWS encryption public 
key, and save it to the audit trail as two 
SymmetricEncryptionKey records, so that both the VT 
and SAWS are able to retrieve this symmetric key at a 
later time. Optionally, the encryption public keys of 
SAWS clients may be used as well to encrypt the 
symmetric key. This symmetric key will be used to 
encrypt/decrypt the client log data to be stored in the log 
file if confidentiality of the audit trail is required. (Note 
that clients can independently send encrypted records to 
SAWS if they want record level confidentiality.) The 
administrator is prompted for the name of the previous 
log file, SAWS opens this, validates it by checking its 
digital signature, then stores the file name, the plain 
accumulated hash and signature of the previous log file in 
the SAWSLastFile record. 
After initialisation, the SAWS server can then 
receive SAWS client log messages, calculate the secure 
hashes and the accumulated hash, optionally encrypt the 
 Tj Lj-1 Lj STj Hj UIDj Snj Mj Encryptj 
Figure2. Format of a Log Record in the Secure Audit Trail 
log records, and save them as ClientLogData records in 
the log file.  
Every time the SAWS server restarts, it needs to first 
perform validation of the current log file. This entails the 
following operations:  
- Recompute the plain accumulated hash of the 
whole log file and check if the signature in the log file is 
present and correct. If it is, this validates the entire log file.  
- SAWS then confirms that the last sequence 
number of the log file is equal to that stored in the TCB. 
This can prevent a replacement attack of the entire log file.  
If the signature validates, then SAWS will start a 
new log file as described above. If any error is found, or 
the signature is absent, this means that SAWS either 
terminated prematurely or the system crashed. In this case 
SAWS needs to validate the incomplete file. SAWS 
retrieves the secure random number from the log file, 
checks the secure hash on each record and checks the 
sequence numbers. SAWS displays an error message for 
each record whose secure hash does not validate correctly, 
and for each pair of records whose sequence numbers are 
not sequential. SAWS also displays the details of the last 
audit file that is recorded in the current log. The 
administrator can determine whether to subsequently 
validate this or not, depending upon the outcome of the 
current process. SAWS recomputes the accumulated hash 
of the log file, and compares this and the last sequence 
number in the log file with those stored in the TCB – if 
they are the same, SAWS can be sure that the log records 
in the current log file are authentic and complete, in 
which case, SAWS adds the certificate record to the audit 
file, writes the plain accumulated hash to the file, digitally 
signs it, writes the signature record at the end of the file 
and closes it. It then starts a new log file as above. 
The validation of a complete audit file by any 
application is straightforward. It can open the audit file, 
recompute the accumulated hash of the whole log file, and 
check the signature using the certificate inside the log file.  
 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have presented a secure audit web service 
(SAWS) that can provide secure audit trail services to 
multiple distributed applications. SAWS is able to receive 
and save client log messages in a secure audit trail file, 
which can be stored on an untrusted machine. Any party 
can subsequently verify its authenticity and optionally 
only authorised parties can read it. Any type of tampering 
with the secure audit file, such as modification, deletion, 
insertion, truncation, replacement or unauthorised 
appending, can be detected. In addition, all the audit trail 
files are chained together in order to detect the loss of one 
or more complete files. Whilst SAWS does not directly 
prevent intrusion or misuse of web resources, nevertheless 
it can aid the detection of intrusions or misuses by 
providing tamper resistant evidence of them after the fact. 
SAWS combined with a trusted computing base (TCB), 
or other physical tamper-resistant hardware can form the 
basis for highly trusted auditing capabilities. SAWS is 
designed to be general purpose, and any application can 
make use of its services for logging and audit purposes. 
Compared with Schneier’s method [1], the basis of trust is 
shifted from the central trusted machine in Schneier’s 
method to SAWS’s own trusted store and optionally, an 
external Certification Authority. This simplifies and 
reduces the security requirements for the trust basis, thus 
it can bring more convenience and flexibility to SAWS 




The authors would like to thank both UK JISC for 
partially funding this work under the DyCom project and 




[1] B. Schneier, J. Kelsey. “Secure audit logs to support 
computer forensics”. ACM Transactions on Information 
and System Security, 2(2), 1999, 159-176.   
[2] http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/ 
[3] C. N. Chong, Z. Peng, P. H. Hartel. “Secure audit 
logging with tamper-resistant hardware”. Proceedings of 
18th IFIP TC11 Int. Conf. on Information Security, 
Security and Privacy in the Age of Uncertainty. D. 
Gritzalis, S. De Capitani di Vimercati, P. Samarati and S. 
K. Katsikas (eds.) , published by Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, Boston, Massachusetts, held in Athens, 
Greece, May, 2003, pp 73-84. 
[4] M. Myers, X. Liu, J. Schaad, J. Weinstein. “Certificate 
Management Messages over CMS”. RFC 2797, April 
2000. 
[5] C. Adams, S. Farrell. “Internet X.509 Public Key 
Infrastructure Certificate Management Protocols”, RFC 
2510, March 1999. 
[6] OASIS. “Web Services Security: SOAP Message 
Security 1.0 (WS-Security 2004)”. OASIS Standard 
200401, March 2004.  
[7] D. Chadwick, O. Otenko. “A Comparison of the 
Akenti and PERMIS Authorization Infrastructures”, in 
Ensuring Security in IT Infrastructures, proceedings of the 
ITI First International Conference on Information and 
Communications Technology (ICICT 2003) Cairo 
University, Editor Mahmoud T El-Hadidi, pp5-26, 2003 
